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We consider the problem of cost sharing in the presence of increasing returns to 
scale and potential strategic behavior on the part of consumers. We show that any 
smooth and strictly monotonic mechanism for which a Nash equilibrium exists for 
all profiles of convex and monotonic preferences must be dictatorial. However, we 
propose a cost sharing mechanism, the decreasing serial mechanism, for which an 
interesting domain restriction ensures existence of a noncooperative equilibrium for 
its cost sharing game. A characterization theorem of the mechanism based on the 
strategic properties of existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of its noncooperative 
equilibrium is provided. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 
C70, C72, D70. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Cost allocation is a practical problem that organizations of all kinds 
face. Universities allocate computing costs among departments. Aviation 
authorities set landing fees for aircraft based on their size. Regulatory com-
missions set rates for electricity, water, and other utilities based on the 
costs of providing these services. The common feature in all of these exam-
ples is that prices are not determined externally by market forces, but are 
set internally by mutual agreement or administrative decision. 
A simple situation where a cost sharing problem can emerge is when a 
set of users share a technology that transforms a single input into a single 
output. We study this cost sharing problem when the cost function is 
increasing and concave. Examples include the division of costs incurred in 
setting telephone lines or a water supply system, the assessment of fees to pay 
for a secretary or a gardener'S services, and so on. The situations we have in 
mind are those of cooperative production or natural nonregulated monopolies. 
For either of these situations there is no obvious answer to the question of how 
to divide the cost of producing the total output among the users. 
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The cost sharing literature provides several examples of mechanisms for 
the allocation of a common cost. In particular, Moulin and Shenker [5] 
introduced the idea of serial cost sharing. They proposed a mechanism 
which allocates a portion of the cost of total supply to each consumer in 
order of increasing demand. Their mechanism should only be used when 
the consumption of every user is easily monitorable since it is not immune 
to secret pools of demands. Agents could benefit by, for instance, averaging 
their demands. The assumption that output and/or input cannot be freely 
transferred across agents gets rid of this possibility (see Moulin and 
Shenker [5]). When the cost function is convex and there exists potential 
strategic behavior on the part of consumers, this mechanism induces a 
game that is dominance solvable and whose unique equilibrium is a strong 
equilibrium. Moreover no other smooth cost sharing mechanism yields a 
unique Nash equilibrium at all preferences profiles. 
Whenever the cost function C is concave, the different users of the 
technology impose a positive externality on one another. One way to think 
of this externality is to identify it with the total surplus or savings, 
(L;= 1 C(q;) - CCL;= 1 q;)), generated because of having more than one 
consumer demanding the good; this surplus should be shared among the 
agents in accordance with their contribution to it. Moulin and Shenker's 
mechanism allocates the largest surplus to the agent with the smallest 
demand. This agent contributes the least to the total surplus but she is the 
one that gets the largest savings. 
We here propose a new mechanism allocating costs to consumers in 
decreasing order of demands. Our mechanism, which is intimately related 
to the one proposed by Moulin and Shenker, allocates the largest surplus 
to the agent with the greatest demand, since in some sense she creates the 
largest positive externality to the others. Moreover each consumer's share 
depends on her own demand and the demands of those who demand more 
than she does. Thus the mechanism generates a hierarchy in the decision 
making process. The first one in,the hierarchy is the agent with the greatest 
demand; she is the one who pays relatively less and who affects all the 
others agents' payments with tier demand. Since we go from the agent 
demanding the most to the one demanding the least we call this formula 
the decreasing serial rule. For purposes of comparison we will refer to 
Moulin and Shenker's mechanistn as the increasing serial rule. 
Our objective is to study the incentive properties of the decreasing serial 
rule when there exists potential strategic behavior on the part of con-
sumers. We assume that each user of the technology has preferences over 
the possible vectors (quantity-payment), and that consumers choose their 
demands strategically. Thus we consider the normal form game where the 
agents' strategies are output demands and where cost shares are distributed 
according to a certain cost sharing mechanism. As is typical in settings 
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like this involving increasing returns to scale, the resulting normal form 
game may not have any Nash equilibria. In fact, our first result is an 
impossibility theorem; we show that under increasing returns to scale, any 
smooth, and strictly monotone mechanism for which a Nash equilibrium 
exists for all profiles of convex and monotone preferences must be dic-
tatorial. Therefore there can be no suitably well-behaved mechanism for 
which Nash equilibria always exist when preferences are only restricted to 
be convex and monotone. 
The decreasing serial mechanism is not dictatorial. It follows as a 
corollary of the above result that this existence problem also applies to the 
game induced by the decreasing serial rule. But there is a domain restric-
tion on preferences for which existence of a Nash equilibrium can be 
guaranteed. The subdomain of convex and monotone preferences that 
allows to guarantee existence of equilibrium for the decreasing serial game 
consists of the set of utility functions where the output is an inferior good. 
Quasi-linear utility functions, the utility functions most commonly used to 
represent preferences over cost shares, are in that subdomain. For these 
particular utility functions, the increasing serial mechanism 1 also induces a 
cost sharing game that possesses at least one Nash equilibrium while the 
games induced by average cost pricing or marginal cost pricing fail to have 
any Nash equilibrium (see Moulin [7]). 
Under this domain restriction the game induced by the decreasing serial 
rule is a game with strategic complementarities, that is to say, one for 
which each agent's best reply function is increasing in the other agents' 
strategies; hence, it always has a Nash equilibrium. It may have multiple 
Nash equilibria, but it has a largest and a smallest Nash equilibrium and 
all other equilibrium quantities lie between these bounds. 
It turns out that the decreasing serial game has interesting welfare 
properties as well. If all agents have the same preferences, the equilibria of 
the decreasing serial game (if any exist) coincide with that from the increas-
ing serial game and both mechanisms yield the first-best. This is not the 
case for the equilibria (if any exist) of the average cost game at which a 
uniform reduction of the common equilibria demands is Pareto improv-
ing.2 Other efficiency properties of the equilibria are the following. We 
1 Moulin [7] compares this mechanism against marginal cost pricing, average cost pricing 
and the Shapley-Shubik mechanism. These mechanisms are compared for the existence of 
Nash equilibrium demand profiles and for the equity properties of these outcomes. He shows 
that among the four only Moulin and Shenker mechanism and the Shapley-Shubik 
mechanism possess at least one Nash equilibrium on the domain of binormal preferences 
(both input and output are normal goods). 
2 Moulin and Watts prove a similar claim in [9]. They assume that cost is convex and 
preferences are binormal. They show that the only way to make agents better otT than they 
are at the Nash equilibrium of the average cost sharing game is to decrease total production. 
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show that if the serial game has a unique Nash equilibrium then the equi-
librium must be strong. Thus no coalition can deviate without decreasing 
the utility of at least one of its members, assuming that the complementary 
coalition still uses the equilibrium strategy. If there exist multiple Nash 
equilibria, the smallest one (that is to say, the one in which each agent 
demands the least among her possible equilibrium strategies) is the unique 
equilibrium that is strong. Moreover, it is the Pareto superior equilibrium. 
Finally, we show that the increasing and the decreasing serial rules are 
the only mechanisms with these strategic and welfare properties. This 
characterization theorem gives a strong argument in favor of serial cost 
sharing in the presence of economies of scale. 
The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 provides the 
basic setup of the paper and it addresses the issue of existence of equi-
librium in cost sharing games. In Section 3 we introduce the decreasing 
serial rule and state some of its normative properties. Section 4 is devoted 
to show the strategic and welfare properties of the noncooperative outcome 
of the game induced by the decreasing serial rule. This section contains a 
characterization theorem of the serial rules based on incentive properties. 
Finally, the Appendixes provide the proofs of our two main theorems and 
of some auxiliary results. 
2. COST SHARING GAMES 
2.1. Basic Setup 
A group of agents (N = { 1, ... , n} ) share a production process that trans-
forms a single (divisible) input into a single homogeneous (divisible) out-
put. Each agent demands a certain amount of the produced output 
(q;, i = 1, ... , n). The total cost of providing these demands is C(L7 ~ I q J 
Throughout the paper, C(.) is assumed to be an increasing and strictly 
concave function, with C(O) = O. We denote by C the set of such functions. 
In a cost sharing game, each agent simultaneously demands an amount 
of output; the cost of producing this output is then divided by a given cost 
sharing mechanism. 
A cost sharing mechanism is a mapping ~ associating to each cost func-
tion C, and vector of demands q = (q I, ... , q n) in ~"t-, a vector of cost 
shares (XI' ... , xn) such that 
and 
Each individual has preferences over the possible vectors input-output, 
(q;, xJ Agent i's preferences are nondecreasing in her output share, q;, 
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nonincreasing in her input share, Xi' and they can be represented by a 
utility function Ui(qi, xJ 
Given a cost sharing mechanism ~, a cost function C in C, and a 
preference profile (u I, ... , un), the corresponding cost sharing game G( C; 
Ub ... , un) has the strategy set 9l+ for each player and the payoff function 
Ui(qi' ~i(C; ql' ... , qn)) for player i. 
The following domain of preferences and endowments is maintained 
throughout. 
::0: Preferences can be represented by strictly quasiconcave C(12 utility 
functions from 9l~ into 9l satisfying the following additional property: 
(AI) Each individual endowment of input is uniformly bounded. That is: 
There is M < 00 such that for all elements in the domain, Xi"; M. 
Assumption (A 1) states that each agent has finite wealth. An alternative 
assumption, equivalent to (AI), would be to consider that indifference cur-
ves in the (qi' xJ plane converge to zero as qi ---> 00. This implies that for 
each agent there exists a level of output for which the extra payment that 
she is willing to make in order to get an additional unit of the good is 
smaller than the marginal cost of producing it, so that no agent will 
demand unbounded quantities of output. 
We now turn to interesting sub domains of ::0. 
::0.,v: Subdomain of::0 containing binormal preferences. Both goods 
are normal for an agent: For all PI' P2 E91+ if z = (q, x) is in the demand 
set on a given budget line PI q - P2X"; b and if b' > b, then the demand set 
on the budget line PI q - P2x"; b' contains at least a point z' = (q', x') such 
that q' ~ q, x' ,,; x. 
If preferences can be represented by a differentiable utility function, nor-
mality plus convexity is equivalent to the marginal rate of substitu-
tion-MRS, from now on-being nonincreasing in X and q. Recall that the 
marginal rate of substitution is the slope dx/dq of the indifference contour. 
The utility function u(q, x) = a(q) - b(x) with a( . ) a concave function and 
b( .) a convex function is an example of a utility function in this sub-
domain. 
::0J : Subdomain of ::0 containing preferences where q is an inferior 
good. The output is an inferior good for an agent: For all PI' P2 E 8i+ if 
z = (q, x) is in the demand set on a given budget line PI q - P2x"; b and if 
b' > b, then the demand set on the budget line PI q - P2X"; b' contains at 
least a point z' = (q', x') such that q' ,,; q, x' ,,; x. 
If preferences can be represented by a differentiable utility function this 
condition is equivalent to the MRS being nondecreasing in x. The utility 
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function u( q, x) = c( q) - d( x) with c(.) and d(·) concave functions is an 
example of a utility function in this subdomain. 
2.2. Nash Equilibrium 
Our objective is to study the noncooperative equilibria of cost sharing 
games. We begin by considering Nash equilibria. Nonexistence of Nash 
equilibria would pose a fundamental difficulty for the decentralized use of 
a mechanism. 
Moulin [7] has conjectured that whenever the cost function is concave 
there is no anonymous mechanism guaranteeing at least one Nash equi-
librium for all profiles of preferences in ~. This is the case for the normal 
form games induced by some of the best known mechanisms; those 
based on average or marginal cost pricing. Consider, for instance, the 
following example due to Moulin which illustrates the lack of Nash equi-
librium for the game induced by the marginal cost pricing mechanism. Two 
consumers with utility functions U1(ql,xd=min{ql,0.25ql+1.5}-xI 
and U2(q2, x 2) =min{3q2' 0.2ql + 19} -X2 share a technology such that 
C( q) = min {2q, 0.5q + 15}. The nonexistence of Nash equilibrium at this 
preference profile is due to the discontinuity of the cost shares of agent 2. 
It is easy to see that the best reply functions are: 
BR1(q2) = G if q2 < 10 if q2?; 10, 
{lO- ql if ql::;;' 3 BR2(ql) = 7 if ql ?; 3. 
For any cost sharing mechanism, for a given choice q _j of strategies by 
the agents other than i, the opportunity set {(qj, xJ such thatx j= ~j(qj, q-J}, 
where, hereafter, q _j refers to the vector (ql, ... , qj_l, qj+ I> ... , q,,), is 
typically the graph of a concave function (with variable qj and value xJ 
Therefore even convex preferences may attain a maximum at two or more 
distinct points. Since agents may not have single-peaked preferences on the 
different opportunity sets they may face, the best reply correspondences 
need not be convex-valued and the cost sharing game may fail to have a 
Nash equilibrium. 
We now show that for a certain family of mechanisms Moulin's conjec-
ture is true. This family, that we will denote by Q, is composed of anony-
mous cost sharing mechanisms satisfying the following two properties: 
(i) Smoothness: ~ is continuously differentiable in ~"t-. 
(ii) Strict monotonicity: (o(/oqj)(q) > 0 for all q in ~"t- and for all i. 
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THEOREM 1. If the cost function is strictly concave, any smooth and 
strictly mono tonic mechanism for which a Nash equilibrium exists for all 
preference profiles in ~ must be dictatorial. 
Proof See Appendix 2. I 
This impossibility result contrasts dramatically with the situation of 
decreasing returns studied by Moulin and Shenker [5, 6]. In the convex 
case there are many anonymous mechanisms for which existence of a Nash 
equilibrium at all profiles of monotonic and convex preferences is guaran-
teed. In particular, the increasing serial cost sharing mechanism induces a 
dominance solvable game whose unique equilibrium is also robust to coali-
tion deviations. 3 
Given Theorem 1, if the cost function is concave we cannot study the 
strategic properties of a mechanism unless we can guarantee the existence 
of Nash equilibria. Thus, to study the strategic properties one should first 
search for a domain of preferences that guarantee the existence of Nash 
equilibria. This is the approach we take in our analysis of the decreasing 
serial cost mechanism, which we shall now introduce. 
3. THE DECREASING SERIAL RULE 
Moulin and Shenker [5] have introduced the idea of serial cost sharing. 
They have proposed a mechanism which allocates a portion of the cost of 
total supply to each consumer in order of increasing demand. Here we 
propose a variation of their mechanism allocating costs to consumers in 
decreasing order of demands. Our allocation scheme means that the agent 
with the greatest demand gets the largest surplus. To be more explicit let 
us now explain how to obtain the different agents' payment. 
The agent with the largest demand, assumed to be the nth without loss 
of generality, will be the one generating the biggest externality, and the one 
contributing most to the total surplus. We would not like the largest 
demander to be hurt by the presence of other users demanding less. That 
is the reason why we want the largest demander to pay the average cost of 
providing n demands identical to her. Hence we fix agent n's payment to 
be C(nqn)/n, where qn is her demand. 
The agent with the next largest demand, say the (n -l)th, will pay the 
average cost of providing n - 1 demands identical to her plus the demand 
of the nth agent, but taking into account the quantity already paid by that 
3 The game induced by the average cost pricing mechanism also possesses Nash equilibria. 
In addition, if preferences are restricted to be in ~.¥ then the equilibrium is unique (see Watts 
[ 13]). 
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agent. If the other (n - 1) agents were demanding as much as her a surplus of 
(n - 1) C(qn-I) - [C( (n - 1) qn-I + qn) - C(nqn)/n] would be generated. 
An equal share of this surplus among them leads to a payment of 
C((n -1) qn-I + qn) - C(nqn)/n 
n-l 
This is the share we propose for the (n - 1 )th agent. All other agents' 
payments are derived from the same reasoning. 
To give the explicit formula we may assume ql ~ q2 ~ ... ~ qn' and 
invoke anonymity in all the other cases. Thus we set, 
where xf is the amount that agent i with demand qi will pay under the 
decreasing serial cost rule when q = (ql, q2' ... , qn). The solution to this 
recursive system yields the closed form: 
x D( ) = C(qi) _ ~ C(qi) 
Iq. L...(. 1) I i=i+1 } }-
with qi=iqi+qi+1 + ... +qn' 
We can see from the above formula that in this mechanism there 
exists a hierarchy in the decision making process (Satterthwaite and 
Sonnenschein [11]); that an agent cannot affect the choices of the higher 
ranking agents although she will be affected by their choices. Since this 
hierarchy goes from the largest to the smallest demander we call this 
mechanism the decreasing serial mechanism. In Moulin and Shenker's 
increasing serial mechanism an agent's cost share is independent of 
demands higher than her own. Formally, 
x;(q) cut) i-I C(qi) 
n-i+l i~1 (n-j+l)(n-j) 
with qi = ql + q2 + ... + (n + 1 - i) qi' 
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Under constant marginal cost both mechanisms prescribe the same 
payments which coincide with those derived from the nucleolus of the co-
operative game with characteristic function v(S) = LiES C(q;) - C(LiES qJ 
Let me now list some of the properties4 of the decreasing serial 
mechanism. We have divided these properties into two groups: Those that 
hold for any increasing C with C(O) = 0 and those that hold only for C in 
C, i.e., properties that require the cost function to be concave as well. 
1. For any increasing C with C(O) = 0 the decreasing serial 
mechanism satisfies: 
MONOTONICITY. xf( q) is nondecreasing in qi. Monotonicity implies 
that if qi ~ q; then Xf(qi' q -i) ~ xf(q;, q-J 
FAIR RANKING. If q i ~ qj then xf( q) ~ x7( q). 
SMOOTHNESS. If C is continuously differentiable on ~:, then xf( q) is 
continuously differentiable on ~: as a function of q. 
2. For any C in C the decreasing serial mechanism satisfies: 
CROSS MONOTONICITY. xf( q) is nondecreasing in qj. This property 
implies that if qj ~ qj then xf(qj, q -j) ~ xf(qj, q -j). 
Cross mono tonicity is crucial for obtaining a lower bound on the 
amount any agent will pay under the decreasing serial mechanism. This 
bound, called the Unanimity Cost Bound, will play a central role in the 
strategic analysis of this mechanism. 
UNANIMITY COST BOUND. 5 xf(q) ~ C(nqi)/n for all q and all i. 
The Unanimity Cost Bound means that an agent must pay at least her 
fair share in the hypothetical situation where all individual demands coin-
cide with her. Moulin [8] (see also [7]) has proposed this bound as a nor-
mative consequence of the fact that differences in individual demands 
should not bear differently on different agents. To see the relevance of this 
bound, consider for instance the average cost pricing which fails this 
bound. Let the cost function be C( q) = Jq. Let us assume three agents 
demand respectively q1 = 3, q2 = 9 and q3 = 18 units of output. The average 
4 Some of the proofs are quite trivial and hence they are omitted. The proof of the cross 
monotonicity of the decreasing serial rule is in Appendix 1. 
5 Notice that the Unanimity Cost Bound serves as a lower bound when the cost function 
is concave and as un upper bound when it is convex. 
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cost pricing proposes payments of 0.54, 1.62, and 3.24 units, respectively, 
since with this mechanism agent i will pay 
One can argue that agents 1 and 2 are paying too little. They pay less 
than their Unanimity Cost Bound, resulting in an unfair charge to agent 3. 
If agent 3 were alone she would pay 4.24 units. Thus, the presence of other 
users saves her 1 unit. This agent, who is the one generating the biggest 
externality, has the smallest savings, since the first agent saves 1.19 units 
(1.73-0.54) and the second one 1.38 units (3-1.62). 
From a normative viewpoint the main drawback of the mechanism that 
we propose is that it may fail the Stand-Alone Test. This test postulates 
that an agent should not pay more than what she would pay if she were 
the sole user of the technology. 
The decreasing serial mechanism can violate this principle when there 
exists a big gap among the demands of the different users. Consider for 
instance that there are only two agents and assume that the first agent 
demands 50 units and the second demands 3 units. If the cost function is 
C( q) = 0J then the decreasing serial mechanism proposes cost shares of 5 
units for the first agent and of 2.28 units for the second one, while if this 
second agent were alone, she would only pay 1.73. Clearly, the more agents 
that are involved in the cost sharing problem the more likely it is that the 
mechanism will pass this test. In the example above if there is a third agent 
with a demand of 10 units then the decreasing serial rule will propose cost 
shares of 4.08, 2.14, and 1.71 units. All the agents are now paying less than 
the payments they would have made if they were alone. The result holds for 
any demand by the third agent in the interval [3, 14.8]. In the same vein, 
if the demands are similar then the stand alone test is always passed. In the 
above example if the demand of the second agent is 7 units instead of 3 
then the cost shares will be 5 units for the agent demanding 50 units and 
2.54 for the agent demanding 7 units, while the payments if they were alone 
would be 7.07 for the first agent and 2.64 for the second. 
If the cost function is concave the failure of the stand-alone test is 
bothersome. The argument for sharing the technology comes from the 
increasing returns which indicates that agents should naturally want to cost 
share. However, the incentive to get together and share costs is undermined 
if the cost sharing method gives some individuals an incentive to go off on 
their own. We would recommend the application of the decreasing serial 
rule only in those situations where this test is either irrelevant or it is 
always passed. It is irrelevant if the agents cannot produce the good by 
themselves (examples are the share of the cost of setting electricity lines or 
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a water supply system). 6 It is always passed if the demands are similar (an 
example can be sharing the costs of a gardener's service among the 
neighbors of a housing estate). 
4. PROPERTIES OF THE DECREASING SERIAL RULE 
In this section we study the strategic and the welfare properties of the 
decreasing serial rule. Among the strategic properties we provide results on 
existence and uniqueness of a noncooperative equilibrium for the decreas-
ing serial game. We also provide a welfare analysis of the rule. In par-
ticular, we provide results about the robustness of the equilibrium with 
respect to coalitional deviations as understood in the definition of the 
strong equilibrium). Finally, we prove that the serial mechanisms (increas-
ing or decreasing) are the only methods with such appealing strategic and 
welfare properties. 
We begin by introducing some notation. 
We will denote a vector in ~n+ by q or by (q i); E N' We write 
(i· q, q i + l' ... , q n) for the vector in ~: with the first i components equal to 
q. Pick any ordered vector q. For i = I, ... , n - I define 
if q ~ qn 
if qn-l ~q~qn 
For i=n write 17(n) for the set of allocations (q. x) such that X= C(nq)/n. 
Fix the demands of all agents j, j i= k, and order them such that 
q 1 < ... < q n _ l' Then agent k's opportunitJ' set is the set of allocations she 
can reach by demanding any quantity of the good. We will denote this 
opportunity set by 1>(k; q -k)' If the cost function is smooth then the 
decreasing serial mechanism is also smooth as a function of q, and every 
agent's opportunity set will be a smooth curve as well. Indeed, it will be a 
continuous and concave curve (with variable qk and value Xk) that consists 
of n pieces. Its graph is 1>( k; q -k) = 17( I; q 1 .... , q n _ d· 
6 In many situations agents cannot produce the good by themselves due to governmental 
regulations. Think of the Electric Power Sector. In the United Kingdom and Spain, for exam-
ple, generators and distribution centers are constrained by a fixed transmission system. Gener-
ator companies might be better ofT having their own transmission system but the government 
does not allow them to do so. Also, consider the case of petroleum refining in Uruguay. It is 
illegal to construct a refinery. However the law mandates that all petroleum exporter com-
panies use the state-owned refinery ANCAP. 
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Let us illustrate the definition of opportunity set with an example. Let 
C( q) = Jq and let n = 3. Let us name the agents a, b, and c and let q a = 20, 
and qb = 10. For this example agent c's opportunity set will be: 
{ {
Xf(q, q, q) 
l/>(c; 10,20) = (q, x) such that x = xf(q, q, 20) 
xf(q, 10,20) 
if q?: 20 
if 10 ~ q ~ 20 
if q ~ 10. 
We define an agent's optimistic utility as the maximum utility level an 
agent can reach on the different opportunity sets she faces. In particular, 
agent i's, i = I, ... , n, optimistic utility on the set 1](n) will be the following 
utility level: 
max Ui(qi' Xi) 
q, 
Xi = C(nqJ/n. 
Agent i's optimistic demand on 1]( n) is the set of solutions to the above 
program. A solution exists since the utility function is continuous and non-
increasing in the payment and the constrained set is nonempty and com-
pact (see (AI)). 
The optimistic demands will play a central role in the study of the 
strategic properties of the decreasing serial game. They are crucial to com-
pute the Nash equilibrium of this game. On the one hand, the multiplicity 
of optimistic demands may yield to best reply correspondences that are not 
convex-valued and to the nonexistence of equilibrium. But, on the other 
hand, the uniqueness of the optimistic demands yields uniqueness of equi-
librium. Theorem 3 in this section hinges on and shows these results. 
4.1. Strategic Properties 
4.1.1. Existence of Nash Equilibrium 
Theorem 1 tells us that there can be no suitably well-behaved mechanism 
for which Nash equilibria always exist when preferences are only restricted 
to be convex and monotone. Since this result applies to the decreasing 
serial mechanism, one could deal with the existence problem by looking for 
domain restrictions on preferences. For any possible domain restriction we 
cannot use the fixed points theorems from convex analysis because the best 
12
reply correspondences are not typically convex-valued. Nevertheless, we 
now show that there exists a subdomain of qg, qgJ' for which the fixed 
point theorems from lattice theory can be fruitfully applied to the decreas-
ing serial game. Thus we provide a subdomain of qg for which existence can 
be guaranteed. The kind of utility functions contained in qgJ include quasi-
linear utility functions (v(q) -x, with v concave and increasing) or CES 
utility functions (qP - xP, 0 < p < 1). 
If the preference profiles are in qg J then the decreasing serial game is a 
game with strategic complementarities. The simplicity of these games 
makes convexity and differentiability assumptions unnecessary. What is 
needed is an order structure on strategy spaces, a weak continuity require-
ment on payments, and the property that players' marginal utility be 
monotone in the strategies of their rivals. 
The formal definitions 7 are as follows. 
DEFINITION 1. A game with strategic complementarities is such that for 
each player i: 
(i) The strategy set Si is a compact lattice; 
(ii) The payoff function Ui is upper semicontinuous in Si for S_i 
fixed, and continuous in S -i for fixed Si; 
(iii) Ui is quasi-supermodular in Si and satisfies the single crossing 
property in (Si; s_J 
DEFINITION 2. Ui(Si, S -J satisfies the single crossing property in 
(Si; S -J, if for all Si' Si E S;, and S -i' S -i E S -i such that Si> Si and 
S -i > S -i one has that 
Ui(Si, S -J > U;(Si' S -i) implies Ui(Si, S -J > Ui(Si' S -J, and 
Ui(Si, S -i) ~ Ui(Si, S -J implies Ui(Si, S -J ~ Ui(Si, s_J 
DEFINITION 3. Ui(Si, s_J is quasi-supermodular in Si if for each S_i and 
for all Si' Si E Si' 
and, 
(ii) U;(Si' S -J > U;(Si /\ Si' S -i) implies Ui(Si v Si' S -J > Ui(Si, S -i)' 
where Si /\ Si denote the greatest lower bound, or meet of Si and Si and 
Si v Si denote the least upper bound, or join of Si and Si' 
7 All the definitions that follow have been taken from Milgrom and Shannon [4 J. 
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The games with strategic complementarities have a series of useful 
properties, including existence of pure strategy equilibria, monotone com-
parative statics on equilibrium sets, coincidence of the predictions of 
various solutions concepts, stability under adaptive learning, and certain 
welfare properties of the equilibria. In the theorems that follow we show 
that the game induced by the decreasing serial mechanism has a nonempty 
equilibrium set in which a largest and a smallest Nash equilibrium exist 
(Theorem 2 below). Its largest Nash equilibrium is the largest strategy sur-
viving the iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. In the 
welfare analysis of the decreasing serial rule we also show that the smallest 
Nash equilibrium is the only equilibrium that is a strong equilibrium; 
moreover, it is the Pareto superior among all the equilibria (these results 
are established in Proposition I). 
THEOREM 2. For all C E C and all (u 1, ... , Un) in f0 oF the decreasing serial 
game is a game with strategic complementarities. Its set of pure strategy 
Nash equilibria is nonempty and possesses greatest and least equilibrium 
points. 
Proof The decreasing serial game has quasi-supermodular payoff func-
tions by the single-dimensionality of the strategy sets. Its payoff functions 
are continuous due to the continuity of the decreasing serial rule and of the 
utility functions. The strategy set for each player i, Si = [0, q J, is a com-
pact lattice because of (A I). Recall that (A 1) guarantees that no agent will 
demand unbounded quantities of output. Thus, to prove the statement of 
the theorem, we have only to show that the payoff functions satisfy the 
single crossing property. 
Let us denote x?(q;, q'-J by y', x?( q;, q -J by x', x?( qi' q -J by x, and 
finally, X?(qi' q'-J by y. We have to show that for all q'-i>q-i and q;>qi' 
if ui(q;, x');;:: Ui(qi, x) then u;(q;, y');;:: U;(qi' y); and if ui(q;, x') > Ui(qi' x) 
then ui(q;, y') > Ui(qi, y). To prove it we first show some results on the 
assignment of cost shares by the decreasing serial rule. 
The mono tonicity of the decreasing serial rule ensures that y' > y and 
x' > x, and the cross monotonicity property ensures that y' > x'. Finally, 
since the cost function is concave, we have x' - x ;;:: y' - y; note that 
and 
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Consider four possible cost shares for agent i, let these be ai, a, fJ' and 
fJ, with a' > a, fJ' > fJ and fJ' > a'. Because the utility functions are in £&J we 
know that if q;> qi and if UJqi' a) = ui(q;, a' ) and Ui(qi, fJ) = u;(q;, fJ') 
hold, then fJ' - fJ ~ a' - a. 
Assume first ui(q;, x') ~ Ui(qi, x). The continuity of the preferences 
implies that there exists z, with z:( x, for which ui( q;, x') = ui ( q i' z), and 
that there exists t, t ~ z, for which ui(q;, y') = U;(qi' t). From the argument 
above, and since the utility functions are in £& oF> it follows that 
y' - t~x' -z. 
We now show that t must be smaller than or equal to y. Assume the 
opposite, that is, consider t > y. We get y' - y> y' - t ~ x' - z ~ x' - x, but 
this contradicts the concavity of the cost function. Hence t cannot be bigger 
than y, and thus, since the utility functions are nonincreasing in the pay-
ment, we can conclude that u;(q;, y') = Ui(qi, t) ~ ui(q;, y). Thus, for all 
q'-i> q -i and q; > qi' if u;(q;, x') ~ Ui(qi, x) then ui(q;, y') ~ Ui(qi, y). 
Assume now ui(q;, x') > U;(qi' x). Because of continuity of the prefer-
ences we know that there exist z and t with t > z, x> z, for which 
ui(q;, x') = Ui(qi, z) and ui(q;, y') = UJqi' t). We have to show that t is 
smaller than y. Because the utility functions are in £&J' it follows that 
y' - t ~ x' - z, whereas the concavity of the cost function implies 
x' - x ~ y' - y. Hence we have y' - t ~ x' - z > x' - x ~ y' - y, and there-
fore y> t. 
We have just shown that the decreasing serial game satisfies the single 
crossing property, thus we can ensure that the decreasing serial game 
belongs to the class of games with strategic complementarities. This implies 
that its equilibrium set is nonempty and a largest8 and a smallest Nash 
equilibrium exist (see Vives [12]). I 
According to the above theorem the decreasing serial game never fails to 
have a Nash equilibrium when preferences are represented by quasilinear 
utility functions. These utility functions constitute the foremost subdomain 
to check for existence of equilibrium in any cost sharing game. From 
Moulin [7] we know that the increasing serial game always has at least 
one Nash equilibrium when preferences are in £&N (therefore, in particular, 
for quasi linear utility functions). This is not the case for the average cost 
pricing game or the marginal cost pricing game that may not have any 
Nash equilibrium when agents have quasilinear utility functions. Moulin's 
result and Theorem 2 together create a strong argument in favor of serial 
cost sharing (decreasing and/or increasing) in the presence of economies of 
scale. 
8 The largest Nash equilibrium is the largest strategy surviving the iterative elimination of 
strictly dominated strategies (see Theorem 10 in Milgrom and Roberts [3]). 
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4.1.2. Uniqueness of Equilibrium 
Results on existence of equilibrium for the whole family of convex and 
monotone preferences9 are required to rely on joint conditions on the 
preferences and on the cost function. We have found a sufficient condition 
on curvature of preferences and payment schedules which guarantees the 
existence of a (unique) Nash equilibrium for the entire domain of convex 
and monotone preferences. It requires indifference curves to have a bigger 
gaussian curvature than that of the mechanism.1O Results involving cur-
vature restrictions are standard means of getting existence results in the 
presence of nonconvexities. Our sufficient condition 11 allows us to prove 
not only existence but also uniqueness of Nash equilibrium. Uniqueness is 
a requirement to predict the outcome of a game and it is important for 
comparative statics analysis. 
Hence we now consider the domain of convex and monotone preferences 
satisfying the following condition: 
(AU) Given CE C, l(d/dq;)[MRSi(qi' xf(q))] I> I (d 2/dqn xf( C; q)1 for 
all q E 9f!: and all (q i' xf( q)). 
Assumption (AU) is a condition that is sufficient enough to ensure that 
each agent has single-peaked preferences on any opportunity set 12 that she 
may face given the decreasing serial rule. In the situation where all agents 
have the same preferences (AU) is equivalent to ensuring that agents have 
single-peaked preferences on the opportunity set C(nq)/n. The next lemma, 
whose proof is in Appendix 1, shows this result. 
LEMMA 1. Given C E C and (U1' ... , un) in q; if(A U) holds relative to C then: 
(i) Each agent has a unique optimistic demand on any opportunity set 
given for the decreasing serial rule. 
9 Consider, for instance, the game in which two agents, let us say A and B, with preferences 
U A = J 40q A - x~ and U B = 3 Jq"; - x~ have to decide their optimal demand. Assume the 
production cost is C( q) = Jq. These preferences are not in D oF but equilibrium exists; 
moreover, it is unique. It corresponds to the strategies (qA = 40, qB = 14.5). Notice that this 
does not imply that this subdomain is not tight, it just shows that by imposing a joint condi-
tion on the domain of preferences and the cost function, it may be possible to have some other 
existence results. We show that this is indeed the case. 
10 A constraint based in gaussian curvatures is used by Balasko and Shell [1] to show the 
optimality of the monetary equilibrium in a model of overlapping generations. 
1\ It is a similar condition to the one proposed by Quinzii [10] to show the nonemptyness 
of the core of a economy with increasing returns to scale. 
12 If the utility functions are homothetic (Cobb-Oouglas, for example), or the cost function 
is such that the marginal cost is concave, a weaker condition may be imposed. Single-peaked-
ness over the set C(nq)/n will be enough to ensure single-peakedness over any other possible 
opportunity set. 
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(ii) Fix q;+ l' ... , qn such that q;+ 1 :( ... :( qn- For every j, j = 1, ... , i, 
let qj be agent j's optimistic demand on the set Yf(k; q;+ l' ... , qn). If q; ~ qjfor 
allj=fi, then agent j's optimistic demand on the set Yf(k-1; q;, q;+l' ... , qn) 
will never be greater than q;. 
If Condition (AU) holds relative to C then the cost sharing game 
G( C; Ul' ... , un) induced by the decreasing serial mechanism is dominance 
solvable, therefore it has a unique equilibrium. 13 
THEOREM 3. For C E C given and for any (Ul' ... , Un) in £0, if Condition 
(A U) holds relative to C, then the decreasing serial game has a unique Nash 
equilibrium. 
Proof The proof of the theorem goes as follows: we first define via 
induction a certain outcome (qt X;LeN and then we show that (q;LeN is 
the unique Nash equilibrium of the decreasing serial game. 
In order to define (q;, xi);eN' we start by solving for each agent i, 
i = I, ... , n, the following program: 
max u;(q;, x;) 
q, 
C(nq;) 
X;=--. 
n 
Let ii; be the solution to the above program. Assumption (A 1) on 
preferences ensures that a solution exists and part (i) of Lemma 1 ensures 
that it is unique. Pick the agent with the largest ii;, let this be the nth agent. 
In any Nash equilibrium agent n's strategy must be iin, since this agent 
attains her maximum possible utility level whenever she uses iiw So we set 
q: = iin and x: = C(niin )/n. 
Next we solve for each agent i, i < n, the program: 
x; 
max u;(q;, x;) 
q, 
C((n-l)q;+q:)-x: 
n-l 
13 One could also define a condition similar to (AU) for the increasing serial rule and have 
an analogous result. 
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We denote by iji the unique solution to this program. We pick the agent 
with the largest iji' without loss of generality let this be the (n - 1 )th agent. 
Part (ii) of Lemma 1 implies that ij n ~ I < ii n' since ii n ~ I was smaller than 
iin· Hence q~~1 =ijn~1 and X~~I =(C((n-l) q~~1 +q~)-x~)/(n-l). 
Assume we have constructed the non-increasing sequence (q'f; xi) for 
i = k, k + 1, ... , n. For each agent s, s < k, we compute her optimistic 
demand on the set ,,(k; q'f; ... , q;). Let us denote these optimistic demands 
ifl' ... , ifk~I' Assume agent (k~ l)th's optimistic demand is the largest one, 
then we set qLI=ifk~1 and xLI=xf~I((k-l)·qLl>qt, ... ,q~). The 
definition is then completed by induction. 
We now show that (qt, ... , q~) is a Nash equilibrium of the decreasing serial 
game, i.e., we prove that for every i EN, qt= arg maxq, Ui(qi, Xf(qi' q'l<.-J). 
Pick an agent i, i E N. Since qt is, by definition, agent i's optimistic 
demand on the set ,,(k;qt+I, ... ,q~), we know that qt=argmaxq,ui(qi' 
xf(i· q'f; qt+ I, ... , q~)). Now (ii) of Lemma 1 implies that qt is agent i's 
optimistic demand on the opportunity set w(i; q'l<.-J, thus qt = 
arg maxq, Ui(qi, Xf(qi' q'l<.-J); and this holds for all i, i = 1, ... , n. 
In any Nash equilibrium each player's strategy must be an optimal 
response to the other players' strategies. Since the sequence (qi)iEN 
contains the players' optimistic demands on the different opportunity sets 
they face given the other players' demands, it is the sequence of optimal 
responses. The uniqueness of the sequence of optimal responses ensures 
the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium of the decreasing serial game. I 
The proof of the above theorem provides an algorithm to compute the 
Nash equilibrium of the decreasing serial game, whenever (AU) holds. We 
first compute the optimistic demands of all the agents on the opportunity 
set C(nq)/n. Pick the agent with the largest one and denote this agent n. 
Agent n's optimistic demand on the set C(nq)/n, let this be q~, is her Nash 
equilibrium strategy. We then compute the optimistic demands of the 
remainder (n-l) agents on the set ,,(n-l;q~). Pick the agent with the 
largest one and denote this agent n - 1. The largest optimistic demand on 
the set ,,(n -1; q~) will be the Nash equilibrium strategy of agent n - 1, 
and so on. From the proof it is easy to see that the decreasing serial game 
is dominance solvable: the successive elimination of strictly dominated 
strategies converges to the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. 
Obviously, the first round of deletion of strictly dominated strategies 
results in the strategy sets being restricted to those strategies not bigger 
than q~. 
4.1.3. Welfare Properties 
We have just shown two results on existence of a noncooperative equi-
librium for the decreasing serial game. 
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Theorem 2 tells us that if preferences are in f!& § the decreasing serial rule 
induces a game for which a Nash equilibrium always exists. The result in 
Theorem 2 does not preclude the multiplicity of equilibria at some 
preferences profiles in f!& §. Despite this multiplicity Nash equilibrium 
behavior in the decreasing serial game has a Pareto superior selection 
which is the smallest Nash equilibrium. It is also a strong equilibrium. If 
communication between players is allowed it is predictable that players will 
agree on this particular equilibrium which determines the outcome of the 
game. 
Theorem 3 states that condition (AU) is sufficient to ensure the unique-
ness of a noncooperative equilibrium for the decreasing serial game at all 
profiles of convex and monotone preferences. This unique equilibrium is a 
strong equilibrium as well. When all agents have the same preferences, con-
dition (AU) ensures the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium for 
either serial game (increasing and/or decreasing). This unique equilibrium 
gives the agents a first best outcome. This is not the case for the average 
cost pricing game where the equilibrium, if it exists, is not first best 
efficient. 
These interesting welfare properties of the decreasing serial game are 
summarized in the following propositions. 
PROPOSITION 1. For all C E C and all (uJ' ... , un) in f!&§ the smallest Nash 
equilibrium of the decreasing serial cost sharing game is the unique strong 
equilibrium of the game: no coalition can deviate without decreasing the 
utility of at least one of its members, assuming that the complementary coali-
tion still uses the equilibrium strategy. Moreover it is the Pareto superior 
Nash equilibrium while the largest Nash equilibrium is the Pareto inferior 
Nash equilibrium. 
Proof Let us assume (qJiEN is the smallest Nash equilibrium of the 
decreasing serial game. Suppose coalition S deviates from this equilibrium 
by using strategies (ij J i E s. Let Y = {i E S such that q i '"' ij i} and let 
Z, Z E !Jl # Y, be the vector defined by Z i = max { q i' iji} with i E Y. Let k be the 
maximum element in z, i.e., Zk?J; Zj for all j E Y. We have two cases to con-
sider: qk < ijk and qk> ijk· 
Consider first the case qk> ijk. Assume agent k has the lth higher 
demand among the demands that constitute the smallest Nash equilibrium. 
When coalition S deviates and player k decreases her demand two situa-
tions can emerge: Either she remains as the agent with the lth higher 
demand, or she becomes the agent with the (1- r )th demand for some 
r = 1, ... , 1-1. 
In the first case it is easy to see that agent k is worse off if the coalition 
deviates because qk is the smallest equilibrium strategy of player k (this 
19
implies Uk(qk, Xf(qk' q-k)) > ukUib xfUh, q-k)) with xfUib q-k) = 
xf((iiiES' (q)i~S) since player k's payment only depends upon demands 
larger than her own. 
If the second case holds, it implies that there exists j such that 
qk)! iij > iib where we assume w.l.o.g. j E S. This implies that 
Uk( qb xf( qb q -k)) > Uk( iib xf( iib q -k)) )! Uk( iib xf( iib iij , q -k. j)). The 
first inequality is due to the fact that qk is the smallest equilibrium strategy, 
recall that q k > ii b and the last inequality is due to the cross monotonicity 
property of the decreasing serial rule. In either case, agent k's utility, k E S, 
decreases when coalition S deviates. 
Consider now the case qk < iik. Let s be the second largest element in Y, 
i.e., ii s )! iij for all j E Y, j i= k. Since q s is player s's smallest Nash equi-
librium strategy we know that us(qs,x~(q)))!usUis,x~(iis,q-s))' with 
strict inequality if qs> iis. Because of the cross monotonicity property of 
the decreasing serial rule the payment of agent s will be bigger with iik than 
with qb therefore us(iis,x~Uis,q-s))>usUis,x~Uis,iibq-s.k)). Hence 
there is at least a member of S that suffers a decrease in her utility if this 
coalition deviates. Notice that uAqs, x~(q)) > us(iis' x~(iis' iib q-s.k)) = 
us(iis, X~((ii;)iES' (q;)i~S))' where the last equality is due to the inde-
pendence of agent s's cost share with respect to demands lower than her 
own. This proves that the smallest Nash equilibrium is a strong equilibrium 
of the decreasing serial game. It is straightforward to see that it is the 
unique strong equilibrium once we know that it is the Pareto superior 
equilibrium. 
We now show that the smallest Nash equilibrium of the decreasing serial 
game is the Pareto superior equilibrium. From Theorem 7 in Milgrom and 
Roberts [2] we know that whenever the players' payoff functions are 
monotone decreasing in the other players' strategies, then the smallest equi-
librium is the Pareto superior equilibrium. The decreasing serial game 
satisfies this property. Note that for each player an increase in other 
players' strategies implies an increase in her payment and thus a reduction 
in her utility. Therefore each player's payoff function is monotone decreas-
ing in the other players' strategies, and thus, our claim holds. I 
PROPOSITION 2. For CEC given andfor any (u" ... ,un ) in~, if (AU) 
holds relative to C then the unique Nash equilibrium of the decreasing serial 
cost sharing game is a strong equilibrium as well. 
Proof Assume, to the contrary, that (qt, ... , q;) is the unique Nash 
equilibrium of the decreasing serial game but that it is not a strong equi-
librium, that is to say, there exists S r;; Nand (ii);ES, with iii i= qi for some 
i E S, such that uj( ii, xf( (ii)iES, (qi);~ s)) )! uj( qj~ xf( q *)) for every j E S. 
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Let k be the biggest index agent in S using a strategy different from q%. 
For this agent, it must be true that uk(iik, XfWl)iES, (qi);rf;s)) ~ 
Uk(q%, xf(q*)). The definition of the decreasing serial mechanism implies 
that xfWhes, (qi);rf;s) = xfUik, q~k)' and the fact that q% is the unique 
Nash equilibrium strategy of agent k implies Uk(q%, xf(q*)) > 
Uk(ijb Xf((ij)iES' (qi);",s)). Therefore we have: 
Uk(ijb Xf((ij);ES' (q'!)irf;S)) ~ uk(q%, xf((qitEN)) 
> Uk(ijb Xf((ij)i";;b (qi);>k))· 
The contradiction proves the claim. I 
4.2. Characterization of the Serial Mechanisms 
To conclude this section we provide a characterization of the serial 
mechanisms within the set of mechanisms in Q, i.e., within the family of 
cost sharing mechanisms satisfying the properties of anonymity, smooth-
ness and strict monotonicity. The characterization theorem relies on the 
strategic and welfare properties of these mechanisms. We fix a cost function 
in C that it is assumed to be continuously differentiable to ensure the 
smoothness of the family of cost sharing mechanisms that we consider. 
THEOREM 4. Let C E C be continuously differentiable and given and let ~ 
be a cost sharing mechanism in Q. If either of the two following properties 
holds: 
1. For all (u" ... ,un) in §, the induced game G(C;u" ... ,un) has at 
most one Nash equilibrium, or 
2. For all (u" ... , un) in §, every Nash equilibrium of the game 
G( C; U" ... , un) is a strong equilibrium as well, then ~ is either the decreasing 
serial mechanism or the increasing one. 
If in addition (AU) holds relative to C, then properties 1 and 2 are equiv-
alent to ~ being the decreasing serial mechanism. 
Proof See Appendix 2. I 
5. APPENDIXES 
Appendix 1 
This appendix contains the proof of the cross mono tonicity property of 
the decreasing serial rule and the proof of Lemma 1. 
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Proof Let us fix j = i + 1, (for any j < i we know that the payment of 
agent i will be independent of qj) and let q = (q 1, ... , q i, q i +" ... , q n). Denot-
ing by P to qi+2 + ... + qn' we have to prove that 
C(i .+'. +P) _ C((i + 1) q;+l + P) 
q, q,+l i+l 
>-C( .. +. +p)_C((i+l)qi+l+P) /' Iq, q, + 1 i + 1 . 
The concavity of C implies 
~ C( (i + 1) q; + 1 + P) - C( (i + 1) q i + 1 + P)· 
Since 1/(i + 1) is smaller than one we have 
C( (i + 1) q; + 1 + P) - C( (i + 1) q i + 1 + P) 
C((i+l)q;+I+P) C((i+l)qi+l+P) >- ---'-'------'-..::...:....:-=----'---'-
/' i+l i+l 
Hence the claim holds. I 
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) Given i < n, and qi+ 1, ... , qn such that qi+ 1 :'( 
. .. :'( q n' the optimistic demands of agent i on the opportunity set 
,,( i; q i+ 1, ... , q n) are the solutions to the following program: 
max Ui(qi, x;) 
q; 
{x~(n. q;) x~_l((n-l) ·qi' qn) Xi= . ~f(i· qi' qi+ 1, ... , qn) 
if qi~qn 
if qn-l:'( qi:'( qn 
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Let, w.l.o.g., qi ~ qi+ 1 be a solution to the above program. A solution to 
this program exists because of (AI). Next we show the uniqueness of the 
solution by proving that the first-order conditions cannot have more than 
one solution. The first-order conditions are: 
8ui(qi, XJ/8qi 
8ui(qi, x i)/8xi 
_ D('. )_C(iqi+qi+l+ ... +qn)-xf+l- ... -x~ 
Xi-Xi 1 qi' qi+l, ... , qn - . . 
1 
Equation (2) into (1) implies the following optimality condition: 
Since the cost function is increasing, Eq. (3) is equivalent to: 
MRSi(qi' xf(i· qi' qi+ I, ... , qn)) 
C(iqi+qi+1 + ... +qn) 
where qi+U ... , qn are fixed. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
If the function g(qJ = (MRSi(qi' Xf(qi' ... , qi' qi+ I, ... , qn))/C(iqi + qi+ 1 
+ ... + q n)) - I is strictly decreasing then Eq. (4) cannot have more than 
one solution. It has at least one solution due to (AI). Condition (AU) 
implies that g( . ) is a decreasing function hence our claim holds. 
(ii) Let qj, q~ be agents' j and i optimistic demand on ,,(k; 
qi+ I, ... , qn). Let us assume, by way of contradiction, qj ~ q~ and qi?; q~, 
where qi is agent j's optimistic demand on the set ,,( i-I; q~, q i + I, ... , q n). 
Thus we have qj ~ q~ ~ qi. Since preferences are single-peaked on every 
possible opportunity set an agent may face, it must be true that 8uj /8qj < 0 
for all qj> qj, and 8uj /8qj> 0 for all qj < qi, where qj = arg maxq uj ( qj' Xj) 
on the set ,,(k;qi+I, ... ,qn) and qi=argmaxquj(qj,xj ) on the set 
,,(i - I; q;, q i + U ... , q n)· This implies that for all qj E (qj, qi) the marginal 
utility of the output, 8u)8qj' must be, at the same time, positive and 
negative; a contradiction. 
The contradiction proves the claim. I 
Appendix 2 
In this Appendix we provide the proofs of our two main theorems which 
proofs are closely related. The proofs are also related to some proofs in 
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Moulin and Shenker [5]. In particular, we make use of three lemmata that 
we take from [5 ]. We here provide the statements of these lemmata for the 
sake of completeness. 
We start by introducing some notations. 
We say that a matrix [a i,}] has a cycle (il, ... , iL ) if the ik element forms 
a nonrepeating sequence such that aiL, il ;6 0 and a ik, ik+ 1 ;6 0 for all 
I ~ k ~ L - 1. A matrix with no cycles of length greater than one will be 
called acyclic. A square acyclic matrix must have an element j such that 
aij = 0 for all i;6 j. We will call j a tail element. We will call subtail to any 
element which breaks a cycle of length smaller than n. We will say that a 
mechanism ~ is acyclic at a point q E 9!!':- if the matrix [8~ j8qJ is acyclic 
at that point. We denote the matrix [8~;/8qJ by Pij' 
Throughout this appendix we work with two families of cost sharing 
mechanisms, Q and a subset of this family that we denote by Il. Recall that 
Q is composed of cost sharing mechanisms that satisfy the properties of 
anonymity, Smoothness and strict monotonicity. n is the subset of 
mechanisms in Q that induce a cost sharing game with at least one Nash 
equilibrium for the entire domain of convex and monotone preferences. 
LEMMA 2. Let ~ be a mechanism in Q. Such mechanism is either the 
decreasing or the increasing serial mechanism if and only if the matrix P ij is 
acyclic for all q E 9!!':-. Moreover, if Pij ~ 0 for all j;6 i then ~ is the decreas-
ing serial mechanism, and if Pij ~ 0 for all j;6 i then ~ is the increasing serial 
mechanism. 
Proof I first show some characteristics of the acyclic matrices since it 
will be helpful in order to follow the proof of this lemma. 
An acyclic matrix can have no cycles of length greater than one. This 
implies that a square (n x n) acyclic matrix must have at least one tail ele-
ment and (n - 2) subtail elements, one for each one of the (n - 2) sub-
matrices of dimension i, i = 2, ... , n - I, which are the principal minors 
associated with the tail element and each of the sub tail elements. The next 
example may help to illustrate this statement. 
Consider the following matrix A: 
a12 0 
a22 a23 
o a33 
a42 a 43 
o ) 
o . 
a44 
Element 4 is a tail for A since a i4 = 0 for all i;6 4. Thus A has no cycles of 
length 4. Nevertheless A is not an acyclic matrix since there exists a cycle 
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of length 3, note that a 12 , a23 , and a 31 are all different from 0 so A has the 
cycle (1,2,3). This matrix converts into an acyclic matrix when one 
assumes a 12 = O. If this were the case then 4 would be the tail element 
of A, 2 would be the subtail element of the principal minor associated with 
a44 , and 3 would be the sub tail element of the 2 x 2 sub matrix that con-
stitutes the principal minor associated with a22 . Therefore if A is acyclic 
then it must have at least one tail element and two subtail elements. 
We can now proceed to prove the lemma. 
The if part of the lemma holds easily, since the matrix P ii associated with 
either serial rule is triangular and therefore it is an acyclic matrix. 
The only part of the lemma is shown in two steps: 
Step 1. In this step we show that the tail element of the matrix P ij 
has to be either I or n. We then show that if I is the tail element of the 
matrix of dimension n, 2 must be the subtail element of the submatrix of 
dimension (n - 1) associated with all' 3 will be the subtail element of the 
submatrix of dimension (n - 2) associated with a22 and so on. 
Consider, by way of contradiction, a mechanism ( in Q and an acyclic 
P ij whose tail element) is different from I or n. 
Since) is a tail element and since budget balance must hold 0:::7= I (i( C; q) 
= C(2:7=1 qi)) then Pjj must be equal to C(2:7=lqd. Consider now the 
rows) - I and) + I of P ij' Because of acyclicity at least one of the following 
cases must hold: 
1. Pj_l.j+1 =0 and Pj+I,j-I #0. 
2. Pj-l,j+I #0 and Pj+l,j_1 =0. 
3. Pj-I.i+I=Pj+I,j-l=O. 
Assume the first one holds. We have Pj-I, j = Pj-I, j+ 1= O. This implies 
that agent) - I's payment does not depend on the demands of agent ) 
or )+ 1. Thus, appealing to anonymity, Pj_l,j_1 must be equal to 
C(3qj_1 + 2:k#j,j-l,j+I qk)' 
At q*, q*E~: with ql=qj*-I #q/+I' the value of Pjj andpj_I,j_1 are: 
Pj_l,j_I=C(3q/_ I + I qZ), 
k#j,}-I,}+I 
and 
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Now Pff(q*) =F Pj-l,f-l(q*) implies that ~ is not an anonymous 
mechanism, contradicting the assumption of ~ in Q. The same reasoning 
applies to cases 2 and 3. The contradiction proves that either I or n must 
be the tail elements of P if' 
Let us assume, w.l.o.g., that I is the tail element of P if' By a similar 
reasoning to the one used above it can be shown that 2 has to be the sub-
tail of the submatrix of dimension n - I associated with Pll' If this were not 
the case then anonymity would fail at q', q' = (q2' q2' q3' ... , qn), since 
Pll(q') would be different from P22(q'). 
Therefore if I is the tail element of P if then P if must be a triangular supe-
rior matrix whose elements in the diagonal are: 
Step 2. We now show that if 1 is the tail element of the matrix P if' 
recall that P if = [ o~ joqj J, then ~ must be the decreasing serial mechanism. 
We start by proving that the elements Pif beneath the diagonal cannot be 
equal to zero. 
Assume instead P if = 0 for some i, j beneath the diagonal. This implies 
that ~if does not depend on qf' therefore Pii must be equal to 
C'((i+ 1) qi+ L(k>f)k",.qk)' But Pu= C'(iqi+ Lk>iqk) since it is an ele-
ment in the diagonal.) The contradiction proves that all Pif beneath the 
diagonal differ from zero. 
To complete the proof we now show that ~ coincides with the decreasing 
serial mechanism. Consider first ~n' Since Pnn = oXn/oqn = C'(nqn) then 
~n(C;q)=C(nqn)/n+B. Take q*=(qn, ... ,qn)' at q* we have UC,q*)= 
~n( C, q*) = C(nqn)/n + B for all i E N. Because of budget balance 
Li ~i( C; q) has to be equal to C(Li qJ This implies B = 0 and, hence, 
~n( C; q) = x~( C; q). 
Consider next ~n-l' Since Pn-l,n-l = C'((n-l) qn-l +qn) then 
~n-l( C; q) = (C((n -1) qn-l + qn)/(n - 1)) + F. Because of ~n-l( C, q*) = 
C(nqn)/n we have that F= -C(nqn)/n(n - I). Thus ~n-l( C; q) = X~_l( C; q). 
Invoking anonymity for the remaining payments, the claim holds. 
Thus steps 1 and 2 prove the lemma. I 
Remark 1. When the cost function is strictly convex Moulin and 
Shenker [5] have characterized the increasing serial mechanism as the only 
mechanism that induces a cost sharing game with a unique equilibrium for 
all preference profiles in ~. The lemma above applies also to convex cost 
functions. Therefore the decreasing sharing mechanism is disqualified in 
their characterization theorem because, for some demands, it might yield 
negative cost shares. Moulin and Shenker [5] rule out transfer of inputs 
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among agents in their definition of cost sharing mechanisms, so the 
payments must be non-negative. 
LEMMA 3. (Claim 2 in Moulin and Shenker [5].) Let ~ be a mecha-
nism in Q. For every q E~: there exists a set of continuously differen-
tiable utility functions (UI' ... , un) in ~ with (8u i(qi, Uq))/8x;) #0 and 
(8ui(qi, ~;(q))/8q;) #0, such that [he set of Nash equilibria associated ~I'ith 
those (uJ, ... , un) contains q. 
LEMMA 4. (Lemma 5 in Moulin and Shenker [5].) Let us consider a 
mechanism ~ E Q. If every Nash equilibrium of the cost sharing game induced 
by ~ is a strong equilibrium as well then the mechanism is acyclic at all 
qE~:. 
LEMMA 5. (Lemma 6 in Moulin and Shenker [5].) Consider a 
mechanism ~ in Q. If there is at most one Nash equilibrium for every profile 
(u l , ... , un) in ~, then the mechanism is acyclic at all q E~:. 
LEMMA 6. Consider a cyclic mechanism ~ in n. If for every (UI' ... , Un) in 
~% the game G(C; u l , ... , un) has at least one Nash equilibrium then ~i has 
to be non increasing in qj' for all qj # qi and for any i E N. 
Proof Fix a ~ E n. Since ~ is a cyclic mechanism then the matrix P ij( q) 
has a cycle at some point q E ~: + . Appealing to Lemma 3 we know that 
there exists a set of continuously differentiable utility functions (u l , ... , un) 
in ~% such that q is a Nash equilibrium of G(C;UI' ... 'Un). Moreover, 
because of Lemma 4 we know that for all the agents in the cycle 
Ui(qi+8£1i,Uq+8A))>Ui(qi,Uq))14 for each i such that £1i#O. For 
these utility functions if the matrix P ij = [8~ ;/8qj] has a cycle then the 
matrix Sij= [8ui(qi, Uq))/8qj] has a cycle as well. Let (1, ... , L) be the 
shortest cycle of the matrix Sij. Since it is the shortest cycle then in the sub-
matrix of dimension L x L the only elements different from zero will be 
those of the cycle (any Sii will be zero since q is a Nash equilibrium). There-
fore ~i is independent of qj for all j # i + 1 and for each i = 1, ... , L - 1. Let 
i be an agent in the cycle. We now show that if £1 i # 0 then £1 i must be 
positive. The acyclicity of ~ implies that for every 8 we can find a preference 
profile (vl, ... ,vn ) in ~N such that for this profile (q) and (q+8A) 
are Nash equilibria of G( C; VI' ... , vn ). For those agents that are not 
in the cycle Vi must be such that qi=argmax[vi(zi'~i(Zi,q_;))] and 
14 Note that Lemmata 3 and 4 refer to preferences in fZ!. Nevertheless it is straightforward 
to show (this is clear from the proofs) that the statement of the lemmata holds if we consider 
preferences in fZ!.¥. 
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qi=argmax[Vi(Zi'~i(Zi,(q+8L1L;))]' Such Vi does exist by the strict 
mono tonicity assumption on the preferences and on the cost sharing 
mechanism. 
For the agents in the cycle, take Vi = Ui. Now the binormality of the 
preferences and the fact that U;(qi+ 8 Lli' ~i(q +8 A)) > U;(qi' ~;(q)) imply 
the result. LI i must be positive since the MRS has to be steeper at 
(qi,Uqi,q~;)) than at (qi'~i(qi,(q+8L1)~;)). If Lli>O and Ui(qi+8L1i, 
~;(q+8A))>Ui(qi,~;(q)) then ~i has to be nonincreasing in qj' for all 
qj =1= qi and for any i = 1, ... , L - 1. Now anonymity ensures that the result 
has to hold for the agents not in the cycle. Lemma 3 renders this conclu-
sion applicable to all q. This completes the proof of the lemma. I 
LEMMA 7. Consider a cyclic mechanism ~ E II. If for every (uj, ... , Un) in 
~f the game G( C; Ul' ... , un) has at least one Nash equilibrium then ~i has 
to be nondecreasing in qj' for all qj =1= q i and for any i E N. 
Proof The proof is very similar to the one in previous lemma so it is 
omitted. I 
x 
C(2q) 
2 
q 
FIG. 1. Agent i's optimistic demands. 
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Proof of Theorem 4. The theorem follows from Lemmata 2, 3, 4, and 5. 
Theorem 3 and Proposition 2 show that if (AU) holds relative to C then 
the decreasing serial game has a unique equilibrium which is strong I 
Proof of Theorem 1. Let ~ be a cyclic mechanism in II. Appealing to 
Lemma 6, ~i has to be nonincreasing in qj for all qj =f. qi and for any i E N; 
while by Lemma 7 we know that ~i has to be decreasing in qj for all qj =f. qi' 
Hence, it must be the case that ~i does not depend upon qj' But this 
implies that the mechanism is not anonymous but dictatorial contrary to 
the assumption that ~ belongs to II. 
Assume now that ~ is an acyclic mechanism in Q. Appealing to Lemma 2 
we can conclude that it has to be either the decreasing serial rule or the 
increasing serial rule. For the increasing serial rule Moulin [7] provides 
an example of a preferences profile in '!fl for which the game induced by 
the increasing serial rule fails existence of a Nash equilibrium. It is 
straightforward to adapt his example for the decreasing serial rule. Instead 
we now provide a graphical example for a decreasing serial game with two 
agents for which the best reply correspondences are not convex-valued and 
;r; 
C(2q) 
2 
8 IJ 
FIG. 2. Agent j's optimistic demands. 
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3 4 8 
FIG. 3. Best replies. 
they do not cross. Figures 1-3 show that the decreasing serial game fails 
existence of equilibrium for some preferences profile in !!fi, as well. 
Thus we can conclude that II is empty as we wanted to show. I 
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